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Sanford Levinson*
“Reflection and Choice”: A One-Time
Experience?1
I am absolutely delighted, as well as obviously honored, to be asked
to deliver this year’s lecture honoring the career of former Lincoln na-
tive and Nebraska College of Law Dean Roscoe Pound.  One could
speak of many facets of his career, one of the most important in the
first half of the twentieth century.  I want to draw a certain inspira-
tion from one of his most famous interventions in public debate, his
1906 address to the American Bar Association on “The Causes of Pop-
ular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.”2  I will not be
speaking today specifically about the administration of justice, at
least in the sense that Pound used it to refer to the justice adminis-
tered by courts.  Much of my recent work has been motivated, how-
ever, by “popular dissatisfaction” with the operation of our political
system, particularly at the national level.
I began my most recent book, Framed: America’s Fifty-One Consti-
tutions and the Crisis of Governance,3 with a litany of quotations from
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at
Austin.
1. Prepared for delivery as the annual Roscoe Pound Lecture at the University of
Nebraska College of Law on March 7, 2013.  I am very grateful for the
opportunity to visit the law school and, more particularly, to Professor Richard
Duncan for taking the lead in inviting me and to Professor Richard Moberly for
taking excellent charge of the mechanics of my visit, including arranging a visit
to the Unicameral, where I was able to spend some valuable time with the
Speaker.  It was, in every way, a banner day, not least because I also had the
opportunity to visit the classes taught by Professors Duncan and Eric Berger, as
well as to meet several really interesting students at a luncheon arranged
through the auspices of Dean Susan Poser.  Anyone who wishes to comment on
any aspect of this lecture should get in touch with me at slevinson@law.
utexas.edu.
2. AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION 11 (1906) (recounting the proceedings but not reprinting
the speech); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1926) (containing Pound’s actual
address).
3. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRI-
SIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012).
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a variety of pundits and analysts across the political spectrum who
describe the contemporary national political system as “dysfunctional”
or even, as New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman put it,
“pathological.”4  A variety of recent polls conducted since I finished
that book about fourteen months ago certainly suggest a similar and
continuing public perception.  For example, as I write these remarks
at the end of July 2013, a compilation of polls taken throughout the
month indicated that approximately 16% of the public “approved” of
Congress, while a bit over 76% “disapproved,” a gap of 60%.5  As a
matter of fact, Congress has generally not enjoyed majority approval
since 1998; interestingly enough, the temporary high of over 80% was
reached in the halcyon days immediately after September 11, 2001,
nearly doubling the approval rate of only 42% in a poll completed on
September 10.6  Since then, it has literally been downhill so far as the
slope of approval is concerned.  The current approval rate of nearly
15% is actually a quite dramatic jump, in one sense, from August
2012, when the Gallup Organization noted that the number had
reached a “historic low” of 10%.7
President Obama does considerably better.  According to Gallup,
he entered Inauguration Day of 2013 with a 50% rate of approval.8  He
has lost some support since then, receiving the “approval” of approxi-
mately 45% at the end of July.  Even the Supreme Court, which tradi-
tionally has scored the highest of our three basic institutions in
popular approval, is seemingly near historic lows.  A Gallup poll taken
in mid-July 2013 found a 43% approval rate for the Court, with 46%
disapproving.9   This represents a slight drop from the 46% approval
level (with 45% disapproving) in July 2012, shortly after the Court’s
decision upholding the insurance mandate in the case testing the con-
stitutionality of “Obamacare.”10  One should not overestimate the im-
portance of the relatively small differences among the various polling
4. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK
243 (2011) (lamenting the “pathologies of the [American] political system”).
5. See Congressional Job Approval, REAL CLEAR POL., http://realclearpolitics.com/
epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-903.html  (last visited July 29, 2013).
6. See Ariel Edwards-Levy, Congress Approval Rating Hits All-Time Low in Gallup
Poll, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/14/congress-approval-rating-all-time-low-gallup-poll_n_1777207.html.
7. Id.
8. Presidential Approval Ratings—Barack Obama, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx (last visited May 20,
2013).
9. Andrew Dugan, Americans’ Approval of Supreme Court Near All-Time Low, GAL-
LUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/163586/americans-approval-supreme-court-near-
time-low.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2013).
10. Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx
(last visited May 20, 2013).
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agencies, which can depend on a variety of vagaries ranging from ba-
sic methodology to the specific days the polls were taken.  That being
said, it should be difficult for anyone actually devoted to the institu-
tions in question to take much comfort from the data, even if Presi-
dent Obama and members of the Supreme Court can emphasize how
much better they are doing, relatively speaking, than Congress.
If one looks at the answers given in April 2013 to the question of
how well things are going in the country today, exactly half of the an-
swers say “pretty badly or very badly” while only 7% say “very well.”11
Perhaps one can take comfort in the fact that 7% represents a doub-
ling of the 3% who a month earlier deemed the country doing “very
well,” but surely this is cold comfort indeed.  Or consider the responses
to another Gallup poll asking, “How much of the time do you think you
can trust government in Washington to do what is right—just about
always, most of the time, or only some of the time?”  At least in 2010,
only 19% said “always/most of the time,” while 81% offered a more
pessimistic answer.12
Still, what does one make of this data?  I have suggested, for exam-
ple, not altogether kiddingly, that King George and the British Parlia-
ment might have registered better numbers in 1775, but so what, even
if that is true?  No one believes the United States is even close to a
“revolutionary” situation.  Indeed, what is most striking is the re-
markable docility of the American public.  Disruptions by members of
the Tea Party of “town meetings” in 2010 brought forth anguished dis-
cussion of the demise of “civility,”13 though, frankly, they were ex-
traordinarily minor as genuinely radical protests go.  And the left is
almost completely quiescent; the various “Occupy” movements, after a
brief flurry, seem to have faded without leaving any trace in American
politics (unlike the Tea Party).14  I recently organized a major confer-
ence at the University of Texas around the question, “Is America Gov-
ernable?”  One’s answer, of course, depends in part on the definition
he or she gives to “governability.”  If “governability”—or what we
might even call the “state of the Union”—is measured by docility and
acquiescence to what government does, even if one finds it objectiona-
ble or even wretched, then the state of the Union is just fine.  One
looks around the world and finds, for example, more marching in the
11. Direction of the Country, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/
right.htm (last visited May 20, 2013).
12. Trust in Government, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-govern
ment.aspx (last visited May 20, 2013).
13. See, e.g., Barbara Ray, The Demise of Civility One Tennis Game at a Time, BABS
RAY (July 10, 2011), http://mybarbararay.com/2011/07/10/the-demise-of-civility-
one-tennis-game-at-a-time/.
14. Michael S. Schmidt, For Occupy Movement, a Challenge to Recapture Momentum,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/
01/us/for-occupy-movement-a-challenge-to-recapture-momentum.html.
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streets or disruptive strikes even in the countries we identify as part
of “democratic Western Europe.”15
But does quiescence equal “popular dissatisfaction” or, perhaps
more ominously, simply the belief that nothing can be done?  Perhaps
we believe, as did Pound,16 that elemental justice requires that we
confront, at least intellectually, the inadequacies of either our system
of justice or of the wider political system.  Perhaps more cynically, as
suggested by Richard Posner’s conservative defense of an at least
modestly redistributive welfare state,17 we might believe that we can’t
afford to take the risk that the measured dissatisfaction, if not con-
fronted and alleviated by necessary reforms, will generate much more
ominous forms of protest, as well as social and political disruption,
even if that is absent today.
So, let me place my own reformist cards on the table.  I believe that
at least some of our present discontents can be traced directly to the
dysfunctionalities generated by the Constitution of 1787.  Conse-
quently, I strongly favor a new national constitutional convention that
could, for the first time in 225 years, subject the Constitution drafted
and ratified in 1787–1788 to rigorous review.  In calling for a conven-
tion—and thinking of the kinds of issues that might be on the table—I
take inspiration from the history of the American states, very much
including Nebraska.  I have come to believe that no one should be al-
lowed to graduate from law school without reading a fine book by John
Dinan, a political scientist now teaching at Wake Forest University,
titled The American State Constitutional Tradition.18  The point that
Dinan makes, and that I incorporate into the title of my own book, is
that it is a grievous error to focus exclusively on the single example of
the United States Constitution and wholly ignore, as is commonly the
case in far too many law schools, the existence of the fifty other state
constitutions and the lessons they might teach us.19  Perhaps the most
important single lesson, beyond the discovery that there is significant
15. See, e.g., Peter Apps, Political Risks to Watch in Western Europe in 2011,
REUTERS, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/12/22/idINIndia-53720820101222
(“Almost all European countries have seen an increase in strikes, street protests
and unrest in the financial crisis—and it looks set to get worse in 2011.”) (last
visited July 30, 2013).
16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
17. See Richard Posner, Contrived and Natural Inequality, THE BECKER–POSNER
BLOG (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/02/contrived-and-
natural-inequalityposner.html; Richard Posner, Income Inequality and Envy,
BECKER–POSNER BLOG (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/
10/luck-wealth-and-implications-for-policy-posner.html (“Inequality could reach
a point at which a relatively small group controlled such a large fraction of the
nation’s wealth that a political movement could rally support for dispossessing
them of their wealth.”).
18. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006).
19. Id. at 4.
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variation in the way that some of our basic institutions can be organ-
ized, is the extent to which state constitutions are far more demo-
cratic—and therefore open to change—than is the national
Constitution.20  Even a modest encounter with state constitutions im-
mediately challenges any facile notion that “Americans believe” in a
single notion of how best to organize government and actually carry
out the important norm of achieving government by “consent of the
governed.”21
Political scientists sometimes refer to the “n-of-1” problem,22 by
which they refer to the difficulty of generalizing from single examples.
Sometimes, to be sure, that is the best one can do, but one should usu-
ally strive to maximize the number of genuinely comparable examples
before making confident declarations about what the evidence demon-
strates.  Nowhere is this problem more exemplified than in the facile
comments we often make about “American constitutionalism” because
we look exclusively at only one of the constitutional data sets available
to us.
Nebraska is of particular importance to me for two reasons.  As
everyone here knows extremely well, Nebraska has seemingly gov-
erned itself quite well for over seventy-five years with only the single
Unicameral.23  I think it is unfortunate that Nebraska remains
unique among the American states in doing so.  If one takes seriously
the notion that a virtue of federalism is that states can become “little
laboratories of experimentation,” in Justice Brandeis’s oft-quoted
term,24 then one should ask about the actual extent to which states
learn from one another and change their own policies or even constitu-
tions in accordance with what has been learned from some other state.
Perhaps, of course, the right question is why Nebraska persists in its
experiment.  Perhaps there are those who argue that the failure of any
other state to imitate Nebraska is proof that the decision to adopt the
Unicameral was a mistake.  My own view, though, is that Nebraska
20. Id. at 3.
21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), available at http://www.
archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html; see also Christian G.
Fritz, Recovering the Lost Worlds of America’s Written Constitutions, 68 ALB. L.
REV. 261 (2005) (emphasizing far greater importance of active popular sover-
eignty in state constitutions than in U.S. Constitution).
22. Sharan B. Merriam, What Can You Tell from an N of 1?:  Issues of Validity and
Reliability in Quantitative Research, 4 PAACE J. OF LIFELONG LEARNING 51
(1995), available at http://www.iup.edu/assets/0/347/349/4951/4977/10245/ba91
cf95-79a7-4972-8c89-73ad68675bd3.pdf.
23. See Kim Robak, THE NEBRASKA UNICAMERAL AND ITS LASTING BENEFITS, 76 NEB.
L. REV. 791, 792 (1997).
24. See New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 7 Side B      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 7 Side B      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 6  2-DEC-13 14:28
244 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:239
ought to be treated much more as the “maker” of valuable lessons on
how to structure state governments than the “taker” of wisdom from
those states that persist in bicameralism.  I am also interested in the
fact that Nebraska, like only North Dakota in the rest of the Union,
requires a supermajority on its supreme court—in Nebraska’s cases,
five out of seven justices—in order to invalidate as unconstitutional
under the Nebraska constitution a law passed by the Unicameral
(and, presumably, signed by the governor).25
It is also crucial to realize, as I am sure you all do, that Nebraska
did not begin with the Unicameral.  Like almost all of the other
states—Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont are the exceptions,
though all, alas, abandoned their original structures26—it began its
existence within the Union with two legislative houses.27  The state
abolished its senate only in 1934, as the result of adoption by the citi-
zenry of a constitutional amendment ratified by the Nebraska electo-
rate.28  John Dinan places this development within the context of
“particularly unpopular legislative sessions in 1931 and 1933” and the
ability of supporters of unicameralism, led by United States Senator
George W. Norris, “to secure far more than the required number of
signatures to place a unicameralism initiative on the ballot.”29  It ap-
pears highly relevant that Nebraska is one of the eighteen states that
allow citizens to initiate constitutional change even without legisla-
tive acquiescence.30  What this means, by definition, is that the citi-
zenry can sidestep “representative government,” which relies
exclusively on elected officials to make judgments about public policy,
and instead engage in “direct democracy,”31 by which “we the people”
become effective policy-makers instead of simply selecting the few
“representatives” who are empowered to make policy.  One might sug-
gest that former Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura, who advocated
abolishing the Minnesota Senate,32 might have been more successful
25. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (amended 1990) (“No legislative act shall be held uncon-
stitutional except by the concurrence of five judges.”).
26. See the recent testimony of Rutgers’s Professor Alan Tarr to the Pennsylvania
legislature on whether that state should return to its original decision.  G. Alan
Tarr, Bicameralism or Unicameralism? (2010), http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/state
con/publications/bicameralism.pdf.
27. Robak, supra note 23, at 791.
28. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1 (amended 2000).
29. DINAN, supra note 18, at 172.
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 1 (1989); REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE
GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., up-
dated ed. 1994).
32. See Governor Jesse Ventura, Service, Not Systems, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y (1999)
http://www.mnhs.org/people/ventura/transcripts/903.pdf (“To accomplish service,
not systems, I am asking for the following: 1. A UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE
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in achieving this quite likely worthwhile goal if Minnesota had emu-
lated Nebraska in allowing citizens to initiate potentially transforma-
tive constitutional amendments.  Otherwise, of course, Ventura was in
effect pleading with senators to vote themselves out of jobs, with pre-
dictable lack of success.
Nebraska has had only two constitutions and continues to operate
formally under the 1875 constitution, in spite of the fact that it held a
full-scale constitutional convention in 1919–1920.33  That being said,
the Nebraska Constitution had been amended 189 times as of 1994,
when Houston political scientist Donald Lutz wrote a classic article on
the process of constitutional amendment.34  I am well aware that the
Nebraska constitution has been amended since then, as with Initia-
tive Measure 416, which was adopted in 2000 and banned legal recog-
nition of same-sex marriage and civil unions.35
For better and worse, Nebraskans have seemingly welcomed the
possibility of thinking seriously about how they are governed and of
changing constitutional essentials—which the Unicameral would cer-
tainly exemplify—if thought to be potentially helpful in achieving
whatever purposes that presumably unite Nebraskans in their com-
mon political identity.  One does not have to embrace every specific
decision that Nebraskans have made (I regret the passage of Initiative
Measure 416) in order to find attractive, when all is said and done, the
ability of Nebraskans to engage in the most solemn task of citizenship.
That involves questioning the adequacy of existing structures of gov-
ernment themselves.  No less a looming presence, James Madison,
quoting the Declaration of Independence, emphasized in his defense of
the 1787 constitutional convention the basic right of all Americans to
“abolish or alter”36 their governments whenever they determined that
they would achieve greater public happiness in doing so.  Americans
demonstrated this most vividly first in seceding from the British Em-
pire via what we call the American Revolution and then by ruthlessly
scrapping the Articles of Confederation in 1787.
to simplify the lawmaking process and force elected officials to be responsive and
accountable to their constituents.”).
33. A. B. Winter, Constitutional Revision in Nebraska: A Brief History and Commen-
tary, 40 NEB. L. REV. 580, 588–89 (1960–1961).
34. Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
237, 248 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
35. See Katie Lofton & Donald P. Haider-Markel, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage
Versus the Politics of Civil Rights: A Comparison of Public Opinion and State
Voting Patterns, in THE POLITICS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 316, 322–23 (Craig A.
Rimmerman & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2007).
36. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 217 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).  See
Fritz, supra note 21 for the importance of these clauses.
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So with these remarks as the introduction that supplies the con-
text within which I am thinking, I come to the significance of my spe-
cific title and its emphasis on “reflection and choice.”  As important as
the Philadelphia Convention was, it did not, in terms of legal fact, give
us a new Constitution.  All the Framers could do was to propose the
replacement of the Articles of Confederation.37  Ratification was the
prerogative of the delegates chosen by a relatively broad—at least for
the time—electorate to attend the state conventions mandated by Ar-
ticle VII of the new Constitution.38  That Article itself was a radical
rejection of the requirement in the Articles of Confederation that any
amendment be validated by the unanimous consent of the state legis-
latures.  It was just this guarantee, seemingly set out in Article XIII of
the Articles of Confederation,39 coupled with their fear that the Con-
vention would “detract even further” from the stature of the Congress
established by the Articles, which presumably encouraged Rhode Is-
landers to refuse to send any delegates at all to Philadelphia.40  Rhode
Islanders were, of course, absolutely correct about the potential conse-
quences of the Convention but absolutely incorrect that Rhode Island-
ers would have the opportunity to exercise the veto ostensibly
guaranteed them by Article XIII.  Perhaps the single most important
decision made in Philadelphia is indeed found in Article VII, inas-
much as it rendered irrelevant what Rhode Islanders thought of the
new Constitution.
Still, there were the other states to worry about, including all-im-
portant states like New York and Virginia, the home states of Alexan-
der Hamilton and John Jay, on the one hand, and James Madison, on
the other.  They are, of course, the three authors of The Federalist,
devoted to encouraging possibly wavering delegates to support the
new document that emerged from Philadelphia.41  There was nothing
inevitable about ratification; the final New York vote was 30–27,42
37. See Jack Rakove, The Road to Philadelphia, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 98, 108 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987).
38. See The Constitutional Convention of 1787, EXPLORING CONST. CONFLICTS, http://
law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/convention1787.html (last visited
Aug. 29, 2013) (providing a link to “The Constitution as Proposed in
Philadelphia”).
39. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1, available at http://mem
ory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=131;
see Rakove, supra note 37, at 99.
40. See Rakove, supra note 37, at 108 (“Two states—including the host, Maryland—
balked at appointing delegates precisely because they feared the conference
would detract even further from Congress’s stature.”).
41. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2–5, 64 (John Jay), NOS. 1, 6–9, 11–13, 15–36, 52–57,
59–61, 65–85 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 10, 14, 18–20, 37–58, 62, 63 (James
Madison).
42. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-
1788, at 345-78, 396 (2010).
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and one might well believe that the vote would have been different
had the anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution not been so un-
wise as to wait until June for their convention, during which New
Hampshire became the all-important ninth state to ratify, which
under Article VII of the Constitution gave it juridical life.43  Equally
important—probably more important as a political matter, given its
population and geographical location—was that Virginia quickly fol-
lowed as the tenth state.44
So how did Alexander Hamilton approach his task, which was in
effect to sell the Constitution to a potentially skeptical audience?  It is
worth looking very closely at Hamilton’s very first submission to the
public in what we know as The Federalist.45  Thus he proclaims at the
very beginning that all Americans are in effect united by their “une-
quivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal govern-
ment.”46  Later, in Federalist No. 15, he will refer to the “imbecil[e]”
quality of that government established by the Articles of Confedera-
tion in America’s “first” (and largely forgotten) constitution.47  One
can easily argue, as in effect did James Madison in Federalist No. 40,
that the most imbecilic feature of the Articles was Article XIII and its
grant of an absolute veto to the extremely small state of Rhode
Island.48
One might still wonder if Hamilton isn’t being somewhat bullying
in his tone.  Did all Americans share the perception that the existing
political order was “inefficac[ious]”?49  Just as important is determin-
ing that even if this were the case, would it necessarily be a term of
opprobrium?  After all, many defenders of the present American sys-
tem drafted by the Convention and then ratified afterward find it a
feature, and definitely not a bug, that it establishes so many veto
points that serve to prevent decision-making by one—or sometimes
even several—American institutions alone.  Consider in this context
Justice Douglas’s evocation of his predecessor Louis Brandeis in the
former’s concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case50 that invalidated Pres-
ident Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills in spite of Truman’s
presumably good faith belief that it was necessary to the American
war effort then taking place in Korea.  “Legislative action may indeed
often be cumbersome, time-consuming, and apparently inefficient,”
43. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers As a Source of the
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 847
(2007).
44. Id. at 847.
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 36, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
46. Id.
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 36, at 75, 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 36, at 216 (James Madison).
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 36, at 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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wrote Justice Douglas.51  But he then went on to quote from Justice
Brandeis’s classic dissent in Myers v. United States:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three depart-
ments, to save the people from autocracy.52
So we should understand that some degree of inefficiency may be a
feature of “efficac[ious]” government rather than an index of a bad
one.  What that degree is may, of course, be difficult, perhaps even
impossible, to determine as a practical matter.
There is still the “imbecility” charge, by which Hamilton suggested
that the system created under the Articles of Confederation made it
impossible, as a practical matter, for the United States to function as
an effective government.53  Hamilton was not, incidentally, the only
person to use such sharp language.  Edmund Randolph, the Governor
of Virginia, according to James Madison’s notes of the Philadelphia
Convention, exhorted his fellow delegates, on June 16, 1787, to do
whatever was necessary to overcome “the imbecility of the existing
Confederacy.”54  The best proof of this proposition probably involves
the raising of revenue,55 essential, among other reasons, to pay for
protecting the country against a variety of potential opponents.   One
might also point to the need for a free trade zone within the new coun-
try that would prevent the tariff wars that were already taking place
depending on the fortuity of the location of seaports and the like.  Yet
there were certainly those at the time, and some American historians
afterward, who disagreed and believed that the United States could
have survived and prospered without the drastic changes proposed by
the Philadelphians and ratified, sometimes by quite narrow margins,
as in New York.56
But I assure you that it is not the purpose of this lecture to offer
any illumination on that particular controversy.  I suspect that Hamil-
ton and his nationalist friends were right about the deficiencies of the
51. Id. at 629.
52. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1927).
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 36, at 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
54. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON 127 (Ohio University Press 1966) (1840).
55. See CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING
OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005).
56. See, e.g., MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-
1781 (1959); Peter Onuf, The First Federal Constitution: The Articles of Confeder-
ation, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 82 (Leonard W.
Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987).  Onuf suggests that “[t]he failures of the
Articles [were] often exaggerated for rhetorical effect,” even if one agrees that
there were sufficient “defects” that justified the Convention. Id. at 97.
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 10 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 10 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-DEC-13 14:28
2013] “REFLECTION AND CHOICE” 249
Confederation.  But, from one perspective, it does not matter.  Even if
one believes that ratification of the Constitution was a mistake, it can-
not be undone.  So discussions of whether the Constitution should
have been ratified in 1788, like those involving, say, the legality of
Congress’s annexation of Texas in 1845 or even the legality or illegal-
ity of South Carolina’s secession in 1860, are “academic” in the some-
what pejorative sense of that word.  One thinks of seminar tables and,
ultimately, irrelevance, rather than an issue that must concern us in
our thinking today.
The far more important question is whether Hamilton’s remarks
not only genuinely resonated within the context of the time and situa-
tion during which he was writing, but also resonate with us today, 225
years later.  Quite obviously, for his initial readers he is defending the
proposed constitution drafted in Philadelphia in what might be called
“real time” and arguing, in no uncertain terms, that it is a decided
improvement that should be accepted by all thoughtful Americans.
But we are not that audience.  We live in our own time, and the ques-
tion for us is what we get, beyond a purely historical understanding,
out of reading Hamilton today.
Perhaps we should wonder why The Federalist continues to ap-
pear, almost yearly, in brand new editions with new introductions.  As
the historian Ray Raphael reminds us in his recent book on “constitu-
tional myths,” the essays that compromise The Federalist are read,
and written about, far more today than was true at the time of their
publication.57  As he notes, following Federalist No. 16, “[N]o essays
were printed in more than one paper out of” New York, and no essay
after Federalist No. 23 even “made it across New York’s borders at
all,” save for Federalist No. 38, which was published in The Freeman’s
Oracle in Exeter, New Hampshire.58  The initial print run of the col-
lected eighty-five essays was 500 copies, “with many of these left un-
sold.”59  To be sure, John Marshall wrote in an 1821 case that “[i]t is a
complete commentary on our constitution; and is appealed to by all
parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth.  Its
intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank . . . .”60  That being said,
though, it remains true that the popularity of The Federalist, and the
explanation for the fact that more than 9,700 articles have been writ-
ten about it, is a result of developments in the twentieth century and
not a reflection of the actual importance of the essays at the time they
were written.  So it is altogether fitting to ask how we ourselves, to-
day, respond to the arguments and language found in The Federalist.
57. See RAY RAPHAEL, CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHS:  WHAT WE GET WRONG AND HOW TO
GET IT RIGHT 106–07 (New Press 2013).
58. Id. at 111.
59. Id.
60. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 418 (1821).
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In any event, I want to consider the implications of Hamilton’s
statement, immediately after his initial denunciation of the existing
framework of government established by the Articles of Confedera-
tion, that
it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct
and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political consti-
tutions on accident and force.61
No sentence more marks Hamilton (or “Publius,” the name under
which he presented his arguments) as a child of the Enlightenment.
He calls on his readers to join him in engaging in an unsentimental,
intellectually ruthless evaluation of their political situation.62  One
can imagine his hated enemy Thomas Jefferson at least agreeing with
the sentiments Hamilton expresses, even if one doubts that Hamilton
ever would have suggested the need for a “revolution” every nineteen
years, as Jefferson at one point seems to have written.63  In any event,
the central question is not the actual views of Alexander Hamilton in
historical time, but, rather, whether we, his readers, more than 225
years after the October 27, 1787 publication of Hamilton’s essay, be-
lieve that it is a continuing project of those who take American consti-
tutionalism seriously to subject the United States Constitution to
Hamilton’s standards of “reflection and choice.”
As already suggested by my opening reference to Nebraska’s con-
stitutional history, we can ask similar questions, and find decidedly
different answers, with regard to America’s state constitutions.  The
principal source for Dinan’s illuminating book, The American State
Constitutional Tradition, after all, is the record of debates held at
many of the more than 230 state constitutional conventions that have
been held over the past two centuries.64  One consequence of these
conventions is that the typical American state has had just short of
three constitutions in its history; Georgia and Louisiana have had 21
constitutions between them!65  So my question, and challenge, is to
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 36, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
added).
62. Id.
63. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William S. Smith Paris (Nov. 13, 1787) (on file
with the Library of Congress), available at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/
thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl64.php (“God forbid we should
ever be 20 years without such a rebellion.”).
64. See DINAN, supra note 18.
65. See Georgia Constitutions, Georgia Constitution Web Page Table of Contents, GE-
ORGIAINFO, http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/gacontoc.htm (last visited Aug. 29,
2013); STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF
STATE CONSTITUIONAL REFORM 1 (George Alan Tarr & Robert Forrest Williams
eds., 2006) (“Louisiana holds the dubious distinction of having adopted eleven
constitutions in less than two centuries.”).
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ask whether we as contemporary Americans—or perhaps anyone liv-
ing elsewhere in the world—feel ourselves empowered to make in-
formed and truly reflective choices about what is necessary to
“establish [the] good government” that Hamilton proclaimed as the
task before us, at least in 1787–1788.66  Or do we instead feel our-
selves to be trapped by contingencies of “accident and force”—includ-
ing what political scientists call the path dependence generated by
prior choices—that make a hollow mockery of claims to political au-
tonomy?  Are any consequences of what Roscoe Pound a century ago
labeled “popular dissatisfaction”67 traceable to the immovable barri-
ers constituted during the earlier 1787–1788 period of “reflection and
choice”?
After all, the American Revolution had been fought in large mea-
sure over claims by the British that the Parliament possessed full sov-
ereignty over its North American colonies, and the triumph of the
Revolution—and of the vision of government by consent of the gov-
erned set out in the Declaration of Independence—was sharply mani-
fested in the first three words of the Preamble to the 1787
Constitution.68  “We the People” would have full control over “or-
daining” a new political order.69  That is just what it means to be a
free people, at least in 1787.
But, as already suggested, Hamilton was not offering praise of un-
fettered will, which could simply be completely arbitrary and unjust.
Instead, what dignified the American experience, and made it of
world-historical importance, is the aspect of reflection that precedes
choice.  Good reasons must be offered to the citizenry at large to be
accepted or rejected on the basis of the quality of the arguments made.
Thus, Hamilton promises, near the conclusion of his essay, to “frankly
acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the
reasons on which they are founded. . . . My arguments will be open to
all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a
spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.”70  It is irrelevant,
frankly, whether Hamilton always lived up to this promise; he almost
certainly did not.  But the point is that he thought it important to as-
sert the importance of what we today are inclined to call “deliberative
democracy.”  We can, more than two centuries later, find Hamilton’s
promise deeply inspirational for us today, speaking to what Lincoln
called the “better angels of our nature,”71 whether or not the historical
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 36, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
67. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 11. R
68. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
69. Id.
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 36, at 3 (Alexander Hamilton).
71. “We are not enemies, but friends.  We must not be enemies.  Though passion may
have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.  The mystic chords of
memory . . . will . . . swell . . . when again touched, as surely they will be, by the
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Hamilton ever envisioned that people would still be reading him two
centuries later for reasons other than specific illumination about the
events of 1787–1788.  So what might it mean to be inspired by Hamil-
ton today?  Concomitantly, what might count as ignoring, or even be-
traying, the wisdom found in The Federalist?
Cynics sometimes refer to would-be democracies emerging from
authoritarian backgrounds as adopting a principle of “one person, one
vote, one time,” suggesting that the winners will use the power gained
by surviving a presumptively legitimate election to entrench them-
selves in power forever.72  So we must ask ourselves if we look at what
happened in 1787–1788 as demonstrating only a truly singular epi-
sode of government created by “reflection and choice,” with the citi-
zenry thereafter unreflectively accepting what was done then.  Or,
instead, does it present a model for We the People throughout our col-
lective lifetime, which includes emulating the Framers first by asking
truly probing questions about the “efficacy”—perhaps even “imbecil-
ity”—of the government established by their Constitution and then of-
fering suggested improvements, even if they are quite radical (as was
the Constitution relative to the Articles), for contemporary “reflection
and choice”?
One can look at the history of the United States since George
Washington’s inauguration in 1789 as featuring additional episodes of
“reflection and choice.”  There have, after all, been some important
textual amendments; one illuminating example is the Twelfth Amend-
ment, added in 1803 prior to the presidential election of the next year
in response to the realization that the electoral college system estab-
lished by the Framers in 1787 was unworkable, perhaps even danger-
ous, once political parties became an established part of the American
political order.73  Some amendments are surely more important than
others—and one of them, of course, was repealed by a successor
amendment74—but all were added to the text after at least some pub-
lic discussion and choice.  Still, I think it is accurate to say that few
people are now living who can remember such reflection and choice;
the last truly significant alteration, after all, was the Twenty-second
Amendment, added in 1951 to remove any temptation that a future
better angels of our nature.”  Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March
4, 1861), reprinted in IV THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 271 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953), available at http://www.
abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/1inaug.htm.
72. See, e.g., Nick Gray, A Cynical View of Middle East Democracy—One Person, One
Vote, One Time?, COMMENTATOR (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.thecommentator.
com/article/1652/a_cynical_view_of_middle_east_democracy_one_person_one_
vote_one_time.
73. See generally TADISHA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787–1804 (1994).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment).
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President emulate Franklin Delano Roosevelt by running for a third
term in office.75  There have been five amendments added since
then,76 but I dare say that only specialists could identify them, and
none of them was the result of any genuine national debate.  Nor has
any had truly measurable impact on the polity in general.
What is required in order to take seriously the possibility of achiev-
ing “reflection and choice” today with regard to a discussion of the ade-
quacy of the United States Constitution?  Let me suggest the following
answers, though they are only the beginning of the inquiry.  First, and
perhaps most obviously, we must assume that the Constitution ought
to be subjected to full and fearless critique.  One might well hope that
it survives the critiques and reinforces what may be a present belief
that it is truly splendid, but, at least for the period of “reflection and
choice,” one will have to suspend any such assumptions and instead
take seriously the possibility that we have blinded ourselves to defi-
ciencies, some of them potentially extremely serious.  Because the
New Hampshire constitution gives the electorate the opportunity
every ten years to call a new state convention, there have been seven-
teen such conventions over its history, but the state still operates
under the 1784 constitution, as amended, rather than a brand new
constitution.77  Presumably one can say this is fairly strong evidence
for the proposition that New Hampshirites genuinely like their consti-
tution, precisely because they have so often subjected it to “reflection
and choice.”  Can one so easily say the same thing about constitutions
that have never been the object of the kind of systematic reflection
that one might well associate with the solemnities of a formal conven-
tion?  Going back to Socrates, it has often been suggested that only the
“examined life” is truly worth living.78  Might one say the same thing
about a polity, that there is something debased about a reluctance to
examine the mechanisms of government that may determine in impor-
tant respects the potential quality of civic life?
But a second assumption is that “we the people” are in fact capable
of such an inquiry, so those who embrace the Hamiltonian creed of full
candor in argument will be received by an audience consisting of per-
sons who will, even if they ultimately reject those arguments, do so in
a spirit of good faith by presenting their own reasons that can equally
be subjected to review by potentially critical readers.  One might say
that there is ample motive for a new convention if one links, as I do,
the causes of popular dissatisfaction to the deficiencies of the United
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII–XXVII.
77. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 100.
78. PLATO, The Apology of Socrates, in APOLOGY OF SOCRATES AND CRITO 55, 138
n.38(a) (Louis Dyer ed., Boston, Ginn & Co. 1895) (“The unexamined life is not
worth living.”).
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States Constitution itself, but that doesn’t resolve the issue of capacity
to engage in the required degree of scrutiny and analysis.  Do we, as a
people, actually possess whatever it takes to engage in genuine self-
governance, to offer a truly genuine “consent” to what, even at their
best, may still be described, at least on occasion, as structures of domi-
nation as well as possible liberation?  This surely involves a mixture of
knowledge and analytic ability, on the one hand, and proper disposi-
tions in behalf of seeking a public interest and capacity for self-disci-
pline and the taming of purely egoistic considerations.
One can scarcely read The Federalist as expressing any great faith
in what we today might view as “democracy.”  Still, Hamilton is ex-
pressing his faith that there exists among his readers a critical mass
of those with the proper disposition and abilities and that it is worth
taking the pains to write the essays we know as The Federalist in an
attempt to engage with them.  Although he expresses a certain skepti-
cism (or cynicism) about the motives of at least some opponents of the
new Constitution, Hamilton professes to concede that some of its oppo-
nents are in good faith, motivated by the same desire he has to serve
the public interest.79  As such, why shouldn’t he expect them to
change their minds when presented with arguments that address
their concerns and demonstrate why they have little, if any, reason to
worry?
Whatever doubts the historical Hamilton might have possessed, he
does in Federalist No. 1 seem to suggest the possibility of an American
public that can be trusted to discuss and then decide absolutely basic
questions that go to the heart of governance.80  Indeed, it would seem
paradoxical even to embark on writing The Federalist, and to desire
its publication in newspapers available to the general public, without
at least some measure of faith in the presumptive reading public.  Do
we think that is possible today?  Or are we inclined instead to dismiss
it as a quixotic, even potentially dangerous, fantasy?
The capacities and dispositions Hamilton must necessarily be
drawing on are especially important in situations like those described
by Publius, that is, a perception that adherence to the status quo
would in effect take us over the cliff into disaster.81  After all, it is
precisely dire situations that most call for both reflection and choice
rather than almost literally thoughtless adherence to conventional
79. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 36 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating
that there are certain classes of men who will either resist all changes that will
lessen their power within their own States, will “aggrandize themselves by the
confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of ele-
vation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than
from its union under one government” but that “even such men may be actuated
by upright intentions . . . .”).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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wisdom.  There would have been no constitutional convention in the
first place, one can confidently surmise, if people thought that the Ar-
ticles were working reasonably well or even merited the response that
critics of the status quo often hear from critics: “If it ain’t broken, it
doesn’t need fixin’.”  This usually means that something has to be at
least on the verge of utter collapse before it merits our attention, given
both the expense of repair and the inevitable uncertainties that any-
thing new would truly be better.  This uncertainty is captured in an-
other adage: “The devil you know is better than the devil you don’t.”
This suggests, interestingly enough, that one may regard the status
quo as quite devilish but, nonetheless, not sufficiently so to warrant
trying a change.
Still, everyone in this audience knows that a new national conven-
tion, let alone a radically revised Constitution, is extremely unlikely.
Why is that the case?  As already suggested, the most satisfying an-
swer would be that Americans have subjected their Constitution to
what the Supreme Court might call “strict scrutiny” and have found it
to be absolutely splendid, in no need of change (save perhaps for those
members of the Tea Party who advocate repealing the Seventeenth
Amendment and returning to the plan of the 1787 Constitution in
which state legislatures selected members of the Senate).  But one can
say with confidence that, however satisfying such an answer might be,
it is surely not correct.  Even those persons one might expect to be
especially interested in the Constitution, such as, say, professors of
constitutional law, rarely spend any time in their classes or their
scholarship on the elemental structures of the Constitution that I
have taken to calling the “Constitution of Settlement.”  Instead, we
obsess, and teach our students to obsess, about a very different Consti-
tution that I now call “the Constitution of Conversation,” precisely be-
cause those particular aspects of the Constitution—think, as the
paradigm case, of the Equal Protection Clause—are subject to endless
conversation and, more to the point, litigation about what exactly they
mean at any given time.  We know as well that the meanings can
change via elections and appointment of new judges committed to dif-
ferent visions of constitutional meaning and possibility.  Even political
scientists, who might be expected to be more interested in the conse-
quences of formal political structures, have exhibited relatively little
interest in close study of basic American institutions.  Perhaps more
to the point, newspaper editorial pages and op-eds rarely discuss what
many readers would no doubt find such boring issues as the value, in
the twenty-first century, of the presidential veto (and the desirability
of having to procure two-thirds of each house of Congress to override
it) or, my particular hobbyhorse, the contribution that Article V makes
to the infantilization of our political discussion by discouraging the
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very idea of constitutional reform inasmuch as it appears, as a practi-
cal matter, impossible.
So one factor that might explain the presence of significant consti-
tutional reform in Nebraska and many other states is simply that
their own constitutions, by making it easier, actually create incentives
for issue entrepreneurs like George Norris to keep pushing for the
Unicameral.82  But that isn’t a sufficient explanation.  One must also
take into account the extent to which Americans are taught, in a word
that is the keystone of Madison’s Federalist No. 49, to “venerate” the
Constitution, to treat it, even if one is not Mormon, as perhaps graced,
as Mormon theology claims, by a Divine presence.83  If, as I have writ-
ten elsewhere, the Constitution serves as the touchstone of America’s
“civil religion,”84 then criticism of the Constitution, and suggestions
that it needs radical revision, is almost literally sacrilegious.  We are
unable to see the Founders, for example, as truly human beings,
which means, by definition, that they are capable of error even if we
can happily concede that they were men of unusual ability.  But even
if we believe that they were unusually free from error in responding to
the realities of 1787, it would treat them truly as almost science-fic-
tion heroes to believe that they had an ability to see far into the future
and, therefore, to create institutions guaranteed to work as well in the
twenty-first century as in the eighteenth.  Had they been capable of
doing that, then perhaps they would have stipulated that Congress
could create not only an army and a navy, but also an air force!
Most Nebraskans, I suspect—I have not done the necessary re-
search—are blessedly ignorant of the particular people who framed
their state constitution, as I suspect is true of states from Maine to
Hawaii.  The one exception may be Massachusetts, inasmuch as that
document is ascribed to John Adams.85  This may help to explain why
the Massachusetts constitution is in fact older than the United States
Constitution by seven years and, unlike most state constitutions, re-
mains unreplaced even after 233 years.86  In any event, “veneration”
of state constitutions is in short supply—and I think this is an emi-
nently good thing at least in any political system predicated on a ro-
bust notion of “self-governance.”
There may be a special irony in the degree to which we have, as a
culture, become almost fixated on our glorious Founders and their
82. See Robak, supra note 23, at 793.
83. See Ezra Taft Benson, Our Divine Constitution, CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LAT-
TER-DAY SAINTS, http://www.lds.org/general-conference/1987/10/our-divine-con-
stitution?lang=eng (last visited June 30, 2013) (At that time, Benson was the
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.).
84. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed.
2011).
85. See Margaret H. Marshall, Foreword, 44 BOST. B. J. 4, 4 (2000).
86. Id.
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handiwork.  Not only does it ascribe to them capacities that no
humans really have, but, perhaps even more to the point, it requires
that we almost willfully blind ourselves to what might be most attrac-
tive in their legacy.  I have already emphasized one of these legacies—
the entreaty by Hamilton in Federalist No. 1 to think for ourselves, to
recognize that it is up to us, using our own faculties of “reflection and
choice,” to assess our governmental institutions and, if need be, to
change them.87
This is captured as well in my favorite among all paragraphs of
The Federalist, the conclusion of James Madison’s Federalist No. 14,
where he urges his readers to reject the protests of defenders of the
status quo who:
petulantly tell[ ] you that the form of government recommended for your adop-
tion is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the
theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible
to accomplish. . . . Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilst they
have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations,
they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for
names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of
their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? . . .  Happily for
America, happily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and
more noble course.  They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in
the annals of human society. . . . They formed the design of a great Confeder-
acy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate.88
Madison’s conclusion is a worthy complement to Hamilton’s injunc-
tion, in Federalist No. 1, to engage in “reflection and choice” with re-
gard to what kind of government America will need in order to attain
the great goals enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and
then the Preamble to the Constitution.89  Both are within the ambit of
the Enlightenment, which can be summarized simply by thinking
deeply of the implications of Madison’s call for his readers to reject “a
blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names.”90  The in-
junction against being blinded by “names,”91 is presumably a refer-
ence to the “genetic fallacy” by which arguments are thought to rest on
the prestige of the persons invoked in their favor than on the basis of
actual evidence that can be adduced to support them.  Instead, he calls
on Americans to rely instead on “the suggestions of their own good
sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their
own experience.”92  Perhaps we can even imagine modern-day Madis-
ons and Hamiltons wearing sweatshirts with the motto “Question Au-
thority!”  There are worse mottos for a free country.
87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 36, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
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In conclusion, then, I return once more to Roscoe Pound and his
eloquent recognition that there was good reason to be dissatisfied with
the operation of our institutions of justice and that we should use our
talents of reasoned analysis to diagnosis our condition and suggest co-
gent remedies.93  I have set out my own diagnosis in two books,
Framed94 and an earlier book, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where
the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct
It),95 and they are the proper topic for another lecture.  In any event,
my deepest concern is not that people might disagree with my particu-
lar views, but rather, that we seem unable and unwilling even to en-
gage in a serious discussion of the very possibility that there is
anything to talk about with regard to the adequacy of our eighteenth-
century Constitution in the twenty-first century.  Earlier generations
of Americans had such discussions, as occurred even on the national
stage a century ago, during the Progressive Era, as well as the many
more discussions that occurred on more local stages, including Ne-
braska’s.  It is time for us to renew that conversation.
93. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
94. LEVINSON, supra note 3. R
95. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITU-
TION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
